Warning: include(/home/jstudies/public_html/includes/leftcolumn.php) [function.include]: failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /home/dirkolin/public_html/archives/moral_compass/index.php on line 34

Warning: include() [function.include]: Failed opening '/home/jstudies/public_html/includes/leftcolumn.php' for inclusion (include_path='.:/usr/local/php5/lib/php') in /home/dirkolin/public_html/archives/moral_compass/index.php on line 34
December 21, 2006
The Moral Compass: Temper, Temper

Posted 12-22-06

I recently read an article in The New York Times about a judge in New Jersey who was suspended from office for inappropriate remarks and for his uncontrolled temper. What exactly happened there?  Does that kind of thing ever happen in New York?

In an opinion decided on November 30, 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court suspended a Superior Court Judge from office for 30 days without pay. The reason? His outspoken ways and "intemperate behavior" were found in clear violation of New Jersey's Code of Judicial Conduct.


The Judge in question had been in front of the state's Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct, New Jersey's judicial disciplinary committee and the equivalent of New York's Commission on Judicial Conduct, four separate times during the past four years for his outbursts and short temper, a "pattern of improper conduct" that amounted to a lack of impartiality and an abuse of judicial power. He was accused of arrogance, sarcasm and abuse of authority. In the end, his bad temper cost him time on the bench.

So how would this type of intemperance be handled in New York, and how often have these types of cases resulted in actual discipline in this state?

The New York Legislature established a temporary disciplinary commission in 1975, and the state Constitution was amended in 1978 to establish a permanent Commission on Judicial Conduct, precisely, in part, to ensure that this kind of intemperate conduct is not allowed to persist. Article 6, Section 22 of the New York State Constitution provides that the Commission "shall receive, initiate, investigate and hear complaints" with respect to the conduct and qualifications of judges. It specifically allows the commission to discipline judges to be disciplined for "habitual intemperance." Unless a judge appeals the commission's decision to the state Court of Appeals, New York's highest state court, the discipline imposed by the commission stands.

For the commission to suspend or remove a judge, however, his or her behavior has to be severe, a pattern of conduct rather than a discrete incidence of misbehavior or indiscretion. In many cases, the Commission will instead impose admonition or censure. What does this mean, exactly? The commission explains in Matter of Fromer (October 24, 1984) that while admonishment is meant to remind a judge of his or her duties, censure is not a reminder of a duty breached by an occasional errant judge, but instead is "a severe critical appraisal and condemnation short of removal" which is "used to sanction conduct which is serious, often repetitive or which tends to result in public disrespect for the courts and our system of justice." Removal, on the other hand, is reserved for only the most egregious misconduct, cases of "great severity." The option of suspension, as in the case in New Jersey, is not available in New York. In cases where the behavior is severe, the choice is between censure or complete removal from judicial office. There is no in-between.

Since the commission began, only 30 of the 845 cases heard by the commission have involved discipline explicitly for intemperate behavior. Eight of these cases resulted in removal. Considering that out of the total of 845 cases, only 145 have resulted in removal over the course of the commission's history, this percentage remains fairly consistent.

It makes sense that the commission takes removal from office very seriously, as this discipline is so severe that it constitutes declaring someone unfit for their profession, taking away their right to do their job. Only in cases where behavior is severe and persistent does the commission find removal from office appropriate and necessary to maintain the dignity of the judicial office and the public's confidence in the administration of justice. This often includes cases in which the judge has been disciplined on multiple occasions for repeated misconduct. For instance, in Matter of Duckman (October 24, 1997), the judge was accused of 15 separate incidents of severe misconduct over a five-year period. The judge in this case persisted in his bad behavior — badgering of lawyers and litigants, and abuse of power — and refused to change his behavior or to admit wrongdoing. The commission found that removal was necessary in order to preserve the public's confidence.

Continue reading "The Moral Compass: Temper, Temper" »


December 08, 2006
The Moral Compass: What Size Justice?

Posted 12-08-06

 
As a citizen of a small town in Upstate New York, I'm especially concerned about the state of the Town and village Courts in our state. I've been keeping up with the recent media expose on these "Justice" Courts, and the stories being told are appalling. What, if anything, is the court system doing to address this issue?


Based on the recent media reports concerning the state of New York's Town and Village Courts, these so called "Justice Courts" certainly fail to mete out justice, in all too many cases. According to an article in The New York Times published on September 25, 2006, these court proceedings often take place in the offices, basements or living rooms of the Town or Village Justice.

 

Some 72 percent of the judges in charge of these proceedings are not lawyers. Some have no more than a high school education. And by some accounts, many fail to understand the basic tenets of justice, denying the rights of litigants by failing to allow them access to a lawyer, sending them to jail without a guilty plea or trial, and verbally abusing litigants during court proceedings. Judicial bias and prejudice is hardly unheard of.
 
These courts, holdovers from Colonial days when justices kept the peace and lawyers were few, make up the large majority of courts in New York State. They employ more than 2,000 justices and handle more than two million cases every year. The daunting size of the Town and Village Justice Court system presents difficulty in its effective monitoring; at the same time, this size also emphasizes the importance of making sure that these courts, the large majority of those in our state, uphold the rights of the state's citizens.


While it is likely that the large majority of Town and Village Justices perform their jobs fairly and justly, it is important that New York State ensure that a high standard of justice is administered uniformly throughout the Justice Court system.


Fortunately, just last week, the courts unveiled an "Action Plan" for town and village courts, which was initiated last June by the New York Office of Court Adminsitration. Among other reforms, this plan would require written transcripts for court proceedings, increased training and supervision for justices, and annual audits of the courts concerning the way they handle fines. It would ensure that indigents are assigned counsel, increase the technology available to these courts, and increase their security budget.
 
Town and Village Justice Courts are technically controlled not by the state court system, but by localities. Although they do not fall under the auspices of the Unified Court System, it is still imperative that uniformity, and quality of justice, be achieved among them. Now that an action plan has been devised, it is important that the state Legislature act to make sure that the majority, if not all, of the proposed reforms are implemented.  Without them, the majority of New York courts, and a good many citizens' only contact with the justice system, will be corroded by potentially shoddy justice. It is important that the Legislature and the courts work together to make sure that these "Justice Courts" are actually just.


November 17, 2006
The Moral Compass: Partner On the Bench?

Posted 11-17-06

My law partner is thinking of running for the position of Town Justice in the spring.  How will this affect my practice?  I have alot of matters before the same court where my partner would sit.  My partner plans on continuing to practice law, so will remain my law partner as well as a part-time Town Justice.
 

If your law partner runs and is elected to the position of Town Justice, this may complicate matters somewhat, for your practice.  A part-time judge may continue to practice law, subject to the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.  Because of the possible appearance of impropriety, and because of the requirement that the judge remain absolutely impartial and unbiased as to matters and parties that appear before him or her, however, he or she would not be able to hear any case that you (or any other partner in your firm, if there are other partners) bring in front of the court where your law partner sits as Town Justice.  Ethics opinions suggest that law partners of a Town Justice cannot appear in that judge's court at all, even before another Justice.  Those attorneys will not be allowed to practice in their law partner/Town Justice's court, at all: period. Even if your partner were to resign from the firm when he or she is elected as Town Justice, the requirement for disclosure and recusal would stay in place for two years.
 
If a large part of your practice involves cases before the Town Court, you may wish to alert your law partner of the issues that will arise for your practice should he or she be elected to serve as Town Justice.


November 03, 2006
The Moral Compass: Can I Keep Clubbing?

Posted 11-03-06

I'm interested in becoming a New York State trial court judge, but I'm slightly concerned about the impact that becoming a judge will have on what I can and can't do in my personal and social life, my political life, and my community involvement. I know that the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct prevent judges from participating in political activity and from being involved in certain community organizations. If I decide to run next year, for instance, will I have to resign from the board of directors of the community organizations on which I currently serve? I'm very involved in my community and would not want to give that up if I decide to go from Esquire to Honorable.

If you decide to run for judicial office, the concerns that you've raised are certainly something that you should consider. If you want to become a judge, judicial office and the independence that you should maintain as a judge has to become your priority, and this fact will have some effect on the rest of your life while on the bench. You should undertake the responsibility of the office understanding this fact, and being okay with giving up political involvement and with being more discretionary about socializing with attorneys who might appear in your court, at the very least while they're on a case that's before your court.

Don't think that you'll have to resign from every position of involvement that you have in your community, however. You can involve yourself with non-profit and community organizations, with only a couple of caveats. First, these organizations should not have as their sole or primary purpose lobbying for particular policies. In other words, you should not involve yourself in organizations that have a mainly political function. You also should not be on the Board of Directors for an organization that might appear before your court on a regular basis, such as a legal services organization, or for an organization whose services the court might use, such as a local youth shelter. You also cannot be involved in fund-raising for any organization that you choose to involve yourself in. Generally speaking, though, you're free to involve yourself with community organizations, as long as you observe these restrictions.
 
Think long and hard before pursuing judicial office if these and other restrictions, meant to maintain judicial independence and uphold the public's confidence in the judiciary, give you pause, because your judicial office must be your main priority should you choose to sit on the bench. That doesn't mean however, that being a judge will mean that your social life and community involvement will end the minute you put on your robe


October 27, 2006
The Moral Compass: Relationships

 

I'm currently representing myself in a landlord tenant matter, and the first time that I appeared on the matter, the judge who is hearing my case made it pretty clear that he knows the attorney who's representing my property management company. Later that week, I saw the attorney having lunch with the judge at a restaurant in town. What are the rules concerning a judge presiding over a case in which he has a social relationship with one of the attorneys?
 
The Rules Governing Judicial Conduct require judges to disqualify themselves in any matter where their impartiality might be reasonably questioned.  Whether the bias is actual or perceived, the judge is at least required to disclose the relationship that he has with this attorney, and in almost all cases should disqualify him or herself if the judge is "close personal friends" with the attorney.  Judges have, in fact, been sanctioned for presiding over cases involving friends.
 
Only if the judge truly believes that he or she can remain impartial, and only if the judge discloses the relationship and the parties consent, is it okay for the judge to continue to preside in such a case.  In your case, it sounds as if this social relationship, which if nothing else creates an appearance of impropriety, is something that the judge should have disclosed on the record.  If he in fact has a close relationship with the attorney, he or she should have disqualified him or herself.


October 19, 2006
The Moral Compass: Ethics Teeth

Posted 10-19-06

 

I am currently a judicial candidate in New York state, and I am aware this year of the increased emphasis on campaign ethics. For instance, all judicial candidates have to undergo mandatory ethics training. But are there really any teeth to these ethics rules? What are the consequences if they are violated?
 
The preamble of the "Rules Governing Judicial Conduct" clearly states that the rules are "rules of reason." It goes on to emphasize that they are "designed to provide guidance to judges and candidates for elective judicial office and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies," but that they are not designed or intended as a basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution."

In other words, a judge or judicial candidate cannot get thrown into jail or hauled into court for committing an ethics violation. That is not what the rules are meant to achieve. Neither are they meant to aid judicial candidates in muckraking campaigns against opponents. They are instead in place in order to maintain the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and to increase the public's confidence in the judiciary. In fact, the reason for the increased emphasis on campaign ethics in this year's judicial campaigns is to help increase the public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial selection process.
 
Ethics rules are not there to help judicial candidates nail each other for every small infraction or to make judicial candidates too nervous to campaign. They are instead there to help guide candidates in maintaining ethical conduct. Resources such as ethics advisory opinions from the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics and from the New York State Bar Association should also help guide candidates' conduct. Candidates truly interested in the dignity and the integrity of judicial office should want to abide by the rules rather than seeing them as a burden.
 
The rules specifically state that while they are meant to guide the conduct of judges and judicial candidates, they are not meant to result in disciplinary action for every minor infraction. If, however, a candidate commits clear and blatant violations — specifically 22 NYCRR 100.5, which governs campaign conduct — several consequences are in play.
 
The body that imposes discipline for the violation of ethics rules is the State Commission on Judicial Conduct.  It might consider the filing by a complainant or act oninformation that comes to its attention from some other source, such as a newspaper article. This is why media scrutiny is so important in judicial elections. The commission will investigate the complaint and decide whether or not to proceed with a hearing. If after a hearing the charges are found to be true, the commission will determine whether to take disciplinary action, which ranges from admonishment to public censure and even disbarrment.

The hope is that the prospect of such disciplinary actions would dissuade a judicial candidate from unethical behavior. Overall, however, the ethics guidelines should be followed by persons running for judicial office because these persons wish to uphold the dignity of their prospective or current office, not because they fear discipline. While the rules are meant to be binding, one would hope that for those running for judicial office, those who will make up the judiciary of our state, these rules would be voluntarily followed, regardless of the teeth that the enforcement process might have.


October 13, 2006
The Moral Compass: Campaign Complex

Posted 10-13-06

 

The recent appellate affirmation of Lopez Torres v. New York State Board of Elections means that — unless the state legislature crafts a different system — New York Supreme Court Justices will be nominated by open primary in 2007. But the court system hasn't addressed how this change affects judicial campaigns (especially regarding when judicial candidates can begin campaigning). I am planning to run for re-election to the Supreme Court next year, and I am confused as to when I can begin campaigning for office, given this new primary system. When does my campaign period begin?


Under the New York State Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, judicial candidates are only allowed to participate in particular political activities, including campaigning for their own office, during a specified interval of time. The candidate's "Window Period" is loosely described in the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, and is defined more specifically in ethics opinions issued by the Commission on Judicial Conduct and the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics. In theory, this restriction is supposed to protect judges from getting mired in a swamp of politics.


Until the period opens, candidates for judicial office are not allowed to attend any political functions or to raise any money for their campaigns. Raising money and beginning to campaign more aggressively will be especially important if Supreme Court Justices are required to participate in an open primary.


No official body has yet spoken as to when Supreme Court Justices will be allowed to begin campaigning for office this year, in light of Lopez. In past opinions, the State Commission on Judicial Conduct has said that a judge may not begin campaigning until nine months prior to the formal nomination or primary. If this definition holds, then judicial candidates will be allowed to begin campaigning on December 11, 2006, nine months prior to the September 11, 2007 primary.

 

The Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics, however, has said that the campaign period begins nine months prior to (1) the date of formal nomination by primary, caucus, or convention, (2) the date of a party meeting where the candidates are endorsed, or (3) the date of the commencement of the petition process, whichever occurs first. If this definitions holds, then judicial candidates are within their campaign period right now, as most political parties meet sometime in April or May to endorse candidates for the November election. This would mean that the campaign window for judicial candidates began sometime in July or August.


Ironically, the Lopez decision was meant to level the playing field for judicial candidates, but the confusion resulting from a system that is slow to respond and adapt fully to changes that are taking place might put some candidates at a disadvantage. A few candidates will likely assume that their campaign windows have already opened. Other candidates will cautiously wait until December, or until a body with authority has spoken definitively on the subject. This means that some candidates will have more time to campaign than others. A couple of months can make a big difference in a political campaign, in which one fund-raiser can bring in thousands of dollars.


The short answer is that no one really knows for sure whether judicial candidates are officially allowed to campaign or not, and this confusion will remain until an official opinion, such as one from the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics, has been issued. The safest bet is to either wait until an opinion comes out or to seek advice from a body such as the Judicial Campaign Ethics Center, which will protect you from any ethics charges if you follow the opinion. Either way, until the mechanics of the judicial election system catch up with the new method of election, the playing field will remain uneven.


October 05, 2006
The Moral Compass: Relative Ethics

Posted 10-06-06

 
How do judicial ethics rules in New York compare to those in other states or other countries?  Besides the impartiality and independence that the judiciary is supposed to aspire to, what about judicial temperament?  I’ve heard horror stories of judges who treat those in their court room like dirt.  Isn’t that unethical?

Judicial ethics rules in New York are similar to most. The basis of these rules is the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Ethics, first drafted in 1972. This code establishes five canons, which form the basis of the Code of Judicial Ethics for almost every state, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Judicial Conference. These canons require that judges (1) maintain integrity and independence, (2) avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, (3) remain impartial and diligent in carrying out their judicial duties, (4) avoid extra-judicial duties that conflict in any way with their judicial duties, and (5) avoid inappropriate political activity.

These five pillars seek to ensure that the justice system functions properly, insulated from any outside influences, while promoting public confidence in the system.  One requirement that the code fails to mention explicitly, however, is judicial temperament, a criterion almost universally regarded as an important consideration in judicial selection. 

Interestingly, recent international law includes judicial temperament as a requirement for the ethical conduct of judges. The Bangalore Principles, which were adopted by the United Nations in 2001, have been integrated into many recently-drafted ethics codes, such as those of emerging democracies. These principles specifically provide that a judge “shall . . . be patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers,” and others who appear before them in an official capacity. 

As important as this ideal is, it is perhaps not mentioned in the code of ethics because of its subjectivity. While judicial temperament encompasses a variety of qualities — including fair-mindedness, patience, and avoidance of pomposity, arrogance, and tyranny — requiring such a temperament as a matter of judicial ethics might prove difficult; while demeanor on the bench is easy to observe, it is much harder to define, and what one person considers fair and patient, another might find cruel and brusque.

Unfortunately, many judges do indeed suffer from reputations for utter intemperance. While Judge Judy is the first judge who comes to mind at the mention of “tyranny on the bench,” many of the judges in our own state court system are known for behavior that is not much better. New York state judges have been known to scream at attorneys from the bench, call them names, and generally throw tantrums in the courtroom. (One recent example even included a judge who had offered a physical altercation to one defendant and a police officer thrashing to another.)

Thankfully, while judicial temperament ming not be explicitly included in our code of judicial ethics, this type of behavior, in its most extreme form, is considered a violation of judicial ethics.

The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct has disciplined judges for calling the counsel before them dogs, for calling mentally incapacitated litigants “more than a little nuts,” and for generally breaching the requirements of judicial temperament in such a way as to impair the public image of the “dignity and impartiality” of the courts. 

While the state’s code of ethics doesn’t explicitly mention temperament, its general purpose and general language provide an instrument that can nonetheless enforce the qualities of temperament that are essential requirements for judicial fitness. Perhaps if the requirement for judicial temperament were more explicitly included in the code, however, judges would treat litigants and attorneys with even greater respect, patience and courtesy. Such egregious cases of judicial misbehavior would be much less likely to occur in the first place were we to expect, and to require, general politeness and courtesy from our judges.

The state legislature might consider that as it begins the process of building a new judicial selection process in time for next year’s elections.


September 29, 2006
The Moral Compass: Electoral Carnage

Posted 09-29-06 

 
Electing judges seems in and of itself antithetical to the idea of judicial independence. Why do we elect judges in the first place? Can this method of judicial selection work without compromising the integrity of the profession?


The popular election of judges in the United States was one of the populist reforms championed by Andrew Jackson in the early 19th century. The appointment of judges up to that point had often reflected the spoils system and party patronage, and the prestige of the bench had declined because judges were appointed based on service to the party rather than based on merit. The hope was that popular election would prevent party leaders from dictating the composition of the bench. New York was one of 19 states to implement judicial elections during the early 1800s.


Ironically, the popular elections merely ushered in another type of patronage. The pressure points have simply  been shifted, such that judicial wannabes cannot now get onto the ballot without the support of party leaders. At the state Supreme Court level, that might well change with the advent of federally mandated open primaries, but the powers that be in Albany still have to weigh in on rebuilding that system. In any event judges are currently still beholden to the party bosses, and they remain so after election, encouraged by the system to appease political leaders whenever they near re-election. In this way, many would argue that judicial elections very much compromise the independence of the bench.


Another controversy surrounding judicial elections is the fundraising necessary to conduct a campaign. Lawyers and large law firms are the parties most vested in the outcome of judicial elections; therefore, lawyers and corporations are most often the parties who contribute to the campaigns of judicial candidates. If judges rely on these campaign contributions to run their campaigns, what are we to make of their relationship to contributors who subsequently appear before them in court?


Ethics guidelines are designed at least partly to allay the effects that the political system has on the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary. In New York, Part 100.5 of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct sets the guidelines and restrictions that are placed on the political activity of judges and judicial candidates.

 

Judicial campaigns are supposed to be much less partisan than those run by non-judicial candidates for office. For instance, judges are not allowed to personally solicit funds for their campaigns, and they are not permitted to make any promise to decide cases a certain way if elected. Judges are also not supposed to know who contributes to their campaigns, and if they do find out, they are under an obligation to recuse themselves if that party comes before them and they feel that this knowledge will compromise their impartiality on the bench. Judicial candidates are further prohibited during their campaigns from donating money to any political party or candidate (other than to attend political events that cost $250 per ticket or less).

 

Quid pro quo is, at least in theory, prohibited.

 

Judges are required to recuse themselves if an attorney who is actively involved in fund-raising for their campaign comes before them during the campaign, and this recusal is mandatory, subject to remittal, for two years following the campaign if the attorney held a leadership or on-going role in the judge's campaign fund-raising activities. Judges are also expected to exercise the appropriate discretion to recuse themselves in any case where they doubt their ability to remain impartial. This last rule will cover any case in which a party involved in getting the judge elected might appear before the judge — a sort of catch-all that is meant to correct for cases where the nature of judicial elections might compromise the ability of the judge to remain impartial and independent. The idea is that the public is choosing someone to exercise the proper discretion in these cases.


The nature of judicial elections and the involvement of judges in political campaigns certainly creates a situation that might jeopardize the independence and the non-partisan nature of the judiciary. However, recent initiatives in New York seek to allay this problem, and include mandatory campaign ethics training for judicial candidates and a hotline that will answer the questions of judicial candidates in need of ethics advice. Judges face disciplinary action, once on the bench, if they fail to comply with their obligations while running for office. These resources at least make judges and judicial candidates more aware of their ethical obligations and more likely to comply.

 

Or so we hope. 

Continue reading "The Moral Compass: Electoral Carnage" »


September 21, 2006
THE MORAL COMPASS

Posted 09-22-06

 
I've read recently about the lobby for an increase in state judicial salaries. I've noticed that it even seems to be high on the priority list for Chief Judge Judith Kay. Why is this such a huge initiative right now? To what extent are judicial salaries actually tied to the quality of the judiciary?  

 
At $136,700 for members of the state Supreme Court (higher for appellate jurists, lower for general trial courts), the salaries of New York State judges hardly seem paltry. In context, however, these numbers fail to impress.

When adjusted for cost of living, according to the National Center for State Courts Judicial Salary Survey for 2006, New York State judicial salaries come in 31st, behind Minnesota, Virginia, Tennessee and Kentucky. In fact, New York's rank fell eight spots from 2004. State judges earn less than some New York State court employees and less than many first-year associates at private law firms. This is an embarrassment considering the prestige and years of experience that a judgeship represents.

 
So, judicial salaries in New York have not kept pace with inflation or with other state and federal judges' salaries. But what does this mean for the New York State judiciary in practice?

 
In New York, the legislature is responsible for voting on judicial salary increases, and these salary increases are linked to their own pay increases. Legislators are usually loathe to raise their own, and consequently to raise judicial salaries, for fear of voter fall-out. This legislative control over judicial salary is antithetical to the idea of judicial independence, because judges are dependent on legislators for a pay increase — and must lobby legislators to achieve this increase.

 

This creates a situation in which the judicial branch is too closely linked to the legislative branch, beholden to them for their livelihood. While legislators in New York might not have the authority to cut judicial salaries, failing to raise their salaries in keeping with the cost of living is, in effect, a pay cut. This link creates dangerous legislative power over the subsistence of the judiciary and politicizes the process.)


In addition, academics have cited judicial salary increases as a means to combat or prevent corruption in the judiciary. Salaries in New York, however, are not so low that judges would need to accept bribes to augment their income, as is the danger in some other countries. The disparity in salaries compared to other lines of legal work, however, creates a separate set of dangers. Because those with the requisite qualifications might earn so much more in other lines of legal practice, judicial salaries might deter many highly qualified individuals from seeking a position on the bench because of the attendant financial sacrifice.

 

Even more important, those who do seek a position on the bench are very likely to be one of two types of individuals: those with a true desire to become a public servant but who also have the financial flexibility to take less compensation or those who are willing to give up the money they might earn in private practice in exchange for the power that a spot on the bench confers.

 

Raising judicial salaries would certainly increase New York's ability to attract highly qualified individuals who might otherwise be reluctant to give up more lucrative careers, or those who are financially unable to make that sacrifice. The quality of the judiciary would increase because of a larger pool of qualified individuals would be attracted — and because fewer individuals would seek the office solely for power. However, the promise of higher salaries to combat corruption, as it might in other countries where bribes augment the incomes of low-paid civil servants, is less of a reality.

 
For that, we must create better nomination systems — and give more power (read: a higher budget) to the Commission on Judicial Conduct. 


September 14, 2006
THE MORAL COMPASS

Posted 09-15-2006

 

I am approaching the end of my term as a New York State trial court judge, and I'm concerned about recent changes to the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The Office of Court Administration circulated a memorandum outlining the Rule changes, but I'm not sure what they mean in context. It just landed on my desk without any real explanation. Because I'm up for re-election in November, I'm especially concerned about the mandatory judicial campaign ethics training, and how the Independent Judicial Screening Commission will affect my candidacy.
 
As you mentioned, the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct recently underwent several revisions and additions.  Especially indicative of the purpose of these changes, the definitions of impartiality, independent judiciary, and integrity were explicitly added to Part 100 of the Rules. Many of the changes made are meant to increase the impartiality, independence and integrity of the judiciary. That's largely due to a documented lack of public confidence in these areas and recent media attention surrounding judicial corruption.
 
Especially significant are the changes surrounding the judicial selection process, which includes mandatory ethics courses for judicial candidates, as well as the appointment of an independent judicial screening commission. The Unified Court System offered the first-ever mandatory judicial campaign ethics training in July. There will be another class offered on September 19. Judges are now required to take these classes before they are elected to judicial office, and they must complete the class within 90 days before or 30 days after they are nominated. This course is available live, or on DVD. These classes teach candidates about permissible campaign conduct, because judges are allowed to campaign but are limited as to the political activity they are allowed to undertake.
 
If you are a Town or Village justice, you are exempt from taking this class. Because Town and Village justices are the only state judges who are not required to be lawyers, some might argue that these are the judicial candidates who would benefit most from ethics training because they are not as familiar with judicial campaigning restrictions. You might consider taking the course even if you are not required to do so, because it will help you avoid ethical violations which could affect your campaign or you potential judicial appointment.
 
The Independent Judicial Screening Commission also represents a fairly significant change in the campaigning process. The purpose of this commission is to assure the quality of judicial candidates. There will be one independent commission per judicial district to review the qualifications of candidates. The rules require that each commission represent the community, with geographic, racial and ethnic diversity. The members are required to reside in the judicial district that they serve.
 
Your participation in the screening will consist of a written application, background investigation, and personal interview. The commission will publish the names of those it finds qualified, by a two-thirds vote. You are allowed to appeal if you are found unqualified. The criteria that the Commissions consider will include: professional ability, integrity, character, independence, reputation for fairness and lack of bias, and temperament — including courtesy and patience. You are not required to participate in the screening, but the list of those who fail to participate will be made public.  
 
While this process might slightly inconvenience judicial candidates, if you are qualified, and if you have maintained decorum in law practice and/ or on the bench, then you should not have anything to worry about. Only those who have constantly lost patience on the bench, those without the requisite legal qualifications, or those who have something to hide in their legal background have anything to worry about. This process will only serve to increase the public's confidence that the judicial selection process will result in a quality judiciary.

 


September 08, 2006
THE MORAL COMPASS

Friend of the court too friendly?
How to complain if your judge cozies up with an opponent

Posted 09-08-06

 

I recently took my landlord to court, only to realize that his lawyer was close friends of the judge.  The evidence was clearly in my favor. The judge would hardly listen to me, though, and found in the landlord’s favor.  I tried to figure out who to go to about this problem, and all I got was a letter from a state agency suggesting that I appeal the decision. I don’t have the money or the time to do this, and I really feel that the judge was blatantly unfair. What should I do?

If you are merely unhappy about a judge’s decision in your case and you do not have any concrete evidence of actual misconduct by the judge, then your main recourse is to appeal the decision.  If you truly feel that the judge was unfair and partial and participated in misconduct in your case, however, you should bring this fact to the attention of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct.

The Commission on Judicial Conduct handles complaints of misconduct of a judge in the Unified State Court System, investigating and then taking disciplinary action where warranted.  Misconduct includes improper demeanor, conflicts of interest, intoxication, bias, prejudice, favoritism, corruption, prohibited business or political activity, and other misconduct on or off the bench.

Filing a complaint with the Commission is easy.  All it takes is a written, signed letter detailing the facts surrounding the alleged misconduct.  Make sure that the letter is as detailed as possible, and includes the name of the judge, the court name, the date or dates on which the misconduct occurred, a description of what occurred, and any other information that might be helpful.  The Commission will review your complaint and decide whether to investigate.

But don't be complacent. The Commission is an anemic body, both because it is underfuned and becuase of weak statutory authority. So consider some alternate activism.

If you really feel that the judge was out of line and that the misconduct was blatant and egregious, you might also contact someone at your local paper to cover the story, or you might write an op-ed for your local paper.  Because the Commission considers complaints based on both written, signed letters from individuals and on its own motion based on information brought to its attention from some other source, such as a newspaper article, the Commission might be more likely to pursue an investigation and take action if a newspaper story brings public attention to the problem.

(Also, and this is important: Realize that your complaint may not be confidential, because the Commission may have to inform the judge of your charges if they choose to pursue your complaint.  This may affect you in a case which is currently before that judge.)

You can mail your letter to:
The Commission on Judicial Conduct
61 Broadway
New York, NY 10006

GOT ANOTHER QUESTION?
EMAIL US AT Info@judicialstudies.com OR
MAIL US AT The Institute for Judicial Studies / 299 Broadway / Suite 1315 / New York, NY 10007


PUBLISHED BY THE INSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES 299 BROADWAY/STE.1315/NYC 10007