Posted 09-22-06

 
I've read recently about the lobby for an increase in state judicial salaries. I've noticed that it even seems to be high on the priority list for Chief Judge Judith Kay. Why is this such a huge initiative right now? To what extent are judicial salaries actually tied to the quality of the judiciary?  

 
At $136,700 for members of the state Supreme Court (higher for appellate jurists, lower for general trial courts), the salaries of New York State judges hardly seem paltry. In context, however, these numbers fail to impress.

When adjusted for cost of living, according to the National Center for State Courts Judicial Salary Survey for 2006, New York State judicial salaries come in 31st, behind Minnesota, Virginia, Tennessee and Kentucky. In fact, New York's rank fell eight spots from 2004. State judges earn less than some New York State court employees and less than many first-year associates at private law firms. This is an embarrassment considering the prestige and years of experience that a judgeship represents.

 
So, judicial salaries in New York have not kept pace with inflation or with other state and federal judges' salaries. But what does this mean for the New York State judiciary in practice?

 
In New York, the legislature is responsible for voting on judicial salary increases, and these salary increases are linked to their own pay increases. Legislators are usually loathe to raise their own, and consequently to raise judicial salaries, for fear of voter fall-out. This legislative control over judicial salary is antithetical to the idea of judicial independence, because judges are dependent on legislators for a pay increase — and must lobby legislators to achieve this increase.

This creates a situation in which the judicial branch is too closely linked to the legislative branch, beholden to them for their livelihood. While legislators in New York might not have the authority to cut judicial salaries, failing to raise their salaries in keeping with the cost of living is, in effect, a pay cut. This link creates dangerous legislative power over the subsistence of the judiciary and politicizes the process.)

In addition, academics have cited judicial salary increases as a means to combat or prevent corruption in the judiciary. Salaries in New York, however, are not so low that judges would need to accept bribes to augment their income, as is the danger in some other countries. The disparity in salaries compared to other lines of legal work, however, creates a separate set of dangers. Because those with the requisite qualifications might earn so much more in other lines of legal practice, judicial salaries might deter many highly qualified individuals from seeking a position on the bench because of the attendant financial sacrifice.

Even more important, those who do seek a position on the bench are very likely to be one of two types of individuals: those with a true desire to become a public servant but who also have the financial flexibility to take less compensation or those who are willing to give up the money they might earn in private practice in exchange for the power that a spot on the bench confers.

Raising judicial salaries would certainly increase New York's ability to attract highly qualified individuals who might otherwise be reluctant to give up more lucrative careers, or those who are financially unable to make that sacrifice. The quality of the judiciary would increase because of a larger pool of qualified individuals would be attracted — and because fewer individuals would seek the office solely for power. However, the promise of higher salaries to combat corruption, as it might in other countries where bribes augment the incomes of low-paid civil servants, is less of a reality.

 
For that, we must create better nomination systems — and give more power (read: a higher budget) to the Commission on Judicial Conduct.