Last June, Thompson was partially reversed in a case in which he allowed a plaintiff from Nassau County to proceed with a suit in the Bronx for a slip and fall at a car wash in the borough. In that case, he should have moved the case to Brooklyn, where the car wash company’s place of business, the Appellate Division said.

In other notable recent Appellate Division rulings on attempts by defendants to get their cases out of the Bronx, and plaintiffs to get their cases in, Bronx County Justice Douglas E. McKeon was reversed last June for being too skeptical of a medical malpractice plaintiff’s claim to Bronx residency. She was temporarily staying with a friend in the Bronx to save money, not as an excuse to sue there, said the Appellate Division. Indeed, she had lived in the borough for most of her life and had a right to avail herself of the local courts.

In December, Bronx County Justice Mary Ann Brigantti-Hughes was reversed for denying the Housing Authority’s motion to move a suit filed by a tenant from the Bronx to Manhattan. Brigantti-Hughes erred, according to the Appellate Division, in treating the neighborhood on upper Broadway known as Marble Hill as part of Bronx County, even though the city code clearly treats it as part of Manhattan.

Awarding the neighborhood to Manhattan “in no way dims the luster of its neighbor to the north, the borough of universities, home of the Grand Concourse and the New York Yankees and the only county in the City of New York on the United States mainland,” the Appellate Division grandly declared. The ruling did, however, trim the reach of the Bronx County court, pushing the Housing Authority building in question into the territory of the New York County court.

Judical Reports has previously analyzed Bronx juries here. 

OTHER NOTABLE REVERSALS

QUEENS COUNTY

The Appellate Division reinstated two traffic lawsuits that struck the appellate judges as more complicated than the Queens trial judges who summarily dismissed them seemed to think.

Justice Arnold Price was too quick to absolve James J. Schnitzer of responsibility for crashing his car into one driven by Brenda Lynch, according to the Appellate Division. She made a left hand turn into his oncoming vehicle, so it would seem that he had the right of way. However, an eyewitness reported that he was going 85 miles per hour just before the crash, raising questions about his possible negligence that warrant a trial, the Appellate Division said. Lynch v. Dobler Chevrolet, Inc. (March 4)

Justice Phyllis Flug summarily dismissed a suit brought by a woman who was hit by a police car that ran a red light. Emergency vehicles have a right written into the traffic law to run a red light, but “only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation.” In this case, said the Appellate Division, the city didn't put to rest questions about whether the officer speeded up instead of slowed down while she approached the intersection where the accident occurred, or whether she was using her emergency siren and flashers when she collided with the plaintiff. Burrell v. City of New York (March 4)

KINGS COUNTY

TORT: When Jennifer Duncan, the plaintiff in a personal injury suit, reported that she couldn't complete a deposition because she had an illness that forced her to avoid “exposure to other people,” Justice Herbert Kramer should have been more skeptical, the Appellate Division said. Instead, on the strength of an unsigned note from a doctor about her condition, he acceded to Duncan’s request to complete her deposition through written interrogatories. Judge Kramer should have demanded a better documented explanation from Duncan before buying her story, the Appellate Division said. And even if it is true that she can't leave home, she could answer questions via live video conference from home. If Duncan isn’t up to the rigors of that, she can ask Kramer for a protective order, armed this time with a letter from a court-designated doctor explaining how answering questions would place her in peril. Duncan v. 605 Third Ave., LLC (March 4)

WORKERS COMPENSATION: Justice David Schmidt let Robert San Miguel dodge responsibility for nearly $200,000 in unpaid workers compensation claims against his company based on an excuse that, according to the Appellate Division, was irrelevant. He offered “vague assertions” that he “had nothing to do” with the workplace injuries. But he did not deny that he was president of the corporation, and that’s all that mattered under the law, the appellate panel said. His potential personal liability does not depend on the extent to which he actively managed the corporations or on the extent to which he might personally have been involved in the underlying accident. He is liable for benefits that have not been paid by the corporation by virtue of being an officer of the company, the appellate panel said, reversing Schmidt and reinstating the Workers Compensation Board’s judgment against San Miguel. Workers' Compensation Board v. Met-Impro Services, Inc (March 4)

LEGAL MALPRACTICE: Leave to amend pleadings should be freely given, but Justice M. Randolph Jackson went overboard when he allowed a plaintiff to drag an old legal malpractice claim into a lawsuit, the Appellate Division said. The statute of limitations had expired on that claim, and the suit that the plaintiff's were now seeking to tack it onto didn't give the defendants any notice of the alleged transactions and occurrences that the plaintiffs, in their malpractice claim, would be complaining about. Leave to amend should not be granted where, as in this case, the other party suffers prejudice or surprise, the appellate panel concluded, reversing Jackson on that point and denying the motion to amend. Shefa Unlimited, Inc. v. Amsterdam & Lewinter (March 4)

NEW YORK COUNTY

LEGAL MALPRACTICE: The Appellate Division reversed two Manhattan trial judges for rulings they made in legal malpractice lawsuits. In one case, the judge was rapped for being too easy on the plaintiff and in the other case, the judge was faulted for too readily letting a law firm off the hook.

Justice Donna M. Mills was reversed for jumping to the conclusion that Alfred Ferrer III committed legal malpractice when he botched a case on behalf of a tenant involved in a suit arising from a rent strike. Ferrer submitted tender offers to the landlord, but since they were conditional, they did not stop interest from accruing, boosting the damage award that his client, Steven Tanger, ultimately had to pay. The lawyer clearly employed an unsuccessful litigation strategy, but that does not constitute negligence as a matter of law, as Mills seemed to think, the appellate panel said. Just how bad Ferrer’s legal advice was is a “contested issue unresolved by discovery,” and “an explication of this strategy necessarily requires trial,” said the appellate panel. To prevail at trial on his malpractice claim, Tanger will have to prove that Ferrer’s approach to the case was doomed to fail. Tanger v. Ferrer (March 4)

Justice Edward H. Lehner was reversed for prematurely dismissing a legal malpractice claim against a law firm that allegedly gave bad advice to the plaintiff, starting years ago, about how to get a building out from under rent control. The statute of limitations on the claim had expired, Lehner said. But the Appellate Division ruled that since the law firm had continuously provided the plaintiff with allegedly errant advice about rent control, the clock on the malpractice claim didn’t start to run until recently, and so it should be put back on track for a trial. West Village Associates Limited Partnership v. Balber Pickard Battistoni Maldonado & Ver Dan Tuin, PC (March 4)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Justice Michael R. Ambrecht should have fixed a flaw in the indictment of Jebb Corliss, who attempted to jump off the Empire State building with a parachute, instead of dismissing it in its entirety, the Appellate Division said. Ambrecht dismissed the indictment of Corliss for reckless endangerment in the first degree on grounds that Corliss so carefully planned his stunt to avoid pedestrians and traffic that he clearly did not exhibit “depraved indifference to human life,” a prerequisite for a conviction on that count. The Appellate Division agreed with Ambrecht that the first-degree reckless endangerment account was over the top. But the evidence before the grand jury was sufficient to establish the elements of reckless endangerment in the second degree, which applies to conduct that creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person. Ambrecht should have ordered a reduction of the charge facing the would-be jumper to that lesser included offense rather than dismissing the entire indictment, the appellate panel concluded. People v. Corliss (March 4)