TORT WAR IN BROOKLYN
By Mark Thompson
Posted 10-24-07
The Appellate Division’s Second Department continues to ride herd on a bunch of trial judges in Brooklyn who seem to be considerably more sympathetic to plaintiffs in personal injury cases than the appellate judges would like.
On October 16, unanimous appellate panels reversed five Kings County judges for allowing personal injury cases to proceed to trial that in the appellate judges’ view should have been dismissed. On the same day, an appellate panel reversed another Kings County judge for denying a defense request for a jury instruction in a case that resulted in a $1 million plaintiff’s verdict. Between them, the six judges who got dinged last week have now been reversed a total of 69 times in the year to date. In 47 of those cases, the ruling that got tossed by the Appellate Division favored the plaintiff while just 18 of the reversals were of rulings that favored the defense. The other four reversals levied against the six judges were for procedural errors and did not necessarily reflect a tilt towards either side.
The most oft-reversed of the bunch, Justice Martin Solomon, has been reversed in full or in part 17 times this year, including 13 times for pro-plaintiff rulings. In the latest such case, Solomon allowed Tadeusz Karwowski to proceed to trial with a claim for a slip and fall on subway stairs, even though he couldn’t say exactly what tripped him up. “In the absence of such evidence, the jury could not return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff without engaging in improper speculation as to the cause of the accident,” the Appellate Division said, reversing Solomon and dismissing the suit. Karwowski v. New York City Transit Authority (October 16)
Justice Sylvia Hinds-Radix, another judge who is often at odds with the Appellate Division, has been reversed 16 times so far this year, including 12 times for rulings that favored plaintiffs. Her latest reversal came in a case in which she allowed Keith Groves to file a late notice of claim six months after he was allegedly assaulted by a bus driver. He blamed his late filing on the fact that he wasn’t aware of the 90-day time limit and the lawyer who initially agreed to take his case backed out, an excuse which passed muster with Hinds-Radix but not with the five appellate judges who reviewed the case. The transit authority would be prejudiced by the delay because it had no prior notice of the alleged incident, so this was not a case in which the plaintiff deserved leeway, the appellate judges explained. Matter of Groves v. New York City Transit Authority (October 16)
Justice Martin Schneier’s 16 reversals in the year to date are evenly split between rulings that favored the prosecution and defense. In the most recent case, he was reversed for allowing a plaintiff who tripped over computer wires in a classroom to proceed with discovery against a computer service company that had done wiring at the school four years earlier, but in a room that housed computer servers, not in the classroom where the plaintiff was injured. According to the Appellate Division, Schneier erred in concluding that further discovery was needed to determine whether the computer service company bore any blame for the plaintiff’s injuries. Camoia v. Custom Computer Specialists, Inc. (October 16)
Justices Howard Ruditzky, Phyllis Flug and Laura Jacobson have been reversed 22 times between them so far this year. In 16 of those cases, their rulings that got reversed were in favor of the plaintiff. Ruditzky’s latest reversal came in a case in which he vacated a default judgment entered against a plaintiff who had allowed his case to languish. Ruditzky accepted an excuse for the plaintiff’s delay in pursuing the case that the appellate panel dismissed as a “conclusory, undetailed, and uncorroborated claim” that his lawyer had somehow dropped the ball. Lugauer v. Forest City Ratner Co. (October 16)
Justice Flug similarly gave more slack to a procrastinating plaintiff than the appellate division was willing to tolerate, allowing a late notice of claim on behalf of infant plaintiff a full decade after the alleged medical malpractice that gave rise to his injuries. Bucknor v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. (October 16)
Jacobson’s error in a personal injury case compelled the Appellate Division to vacate a jury’s award of nearly $1 million in damages to Erica Ruiz, who tripped on an obvious hole in the carpet at the top of a staircase, tumbled down the stairs and severely broke her ankle. According to the Appellate Division, Jacobson should have instructed the jurors that if they concluded that the hazard was “open and obvious,” the landlord had no duty to warn about it. Ruiz v. Hart Elm Corp. (October 16)
OTHER NOTABLE REVERSALS
KINGS COUNTY
Not all of the Second Department’s reversals of Kings County rulings cut against the plaintiff.
TORT: Justice Patricia Satterfield was reversed for too hastily dismissing a personal injury suit against a landlord who kept a refrigerator in a narrow stairway for more than a month before Cidia Fabish allegedly fell while trying to squeeze past it to get to her apartment. That landlord, who admittedly was aware that Fabish had complained several times about the refrigerator, did not made out a case warranting summary judgment in its favor, the Appellate Division said. Fabish v. Garden Bay Manor Condominium (October 16)
TORT: Justice Lawrence Knipel properly denied the motion by the estate of Colleen Boskin for leave to file a late notice of claim against the city and the police department because those defendants had no prior notice of the accident at issue in the case and therefore would be prejudiced by the late claim. However, in the case of another defendant, the transit authority, its employees were directly involved in the events leading up to and culminating in Boskin's electrocution. So the transit agency had reasonable notice from which it could infer that it was potentially liable, and since the complaint appear to have merit, Knipel should have allowed the plaintiff to file a late claim against that defendant, the appellate judges said. Matter of Boskin v. New York City Transit Authority (October 16)
BRONX COUNTY
TORT: Justice Janice L. Bowman found open questions where the Appellate Division found none regarding whether the city was to blame for the injuries sustained by a pedestrian, who was hit by a car that jumped a curb. As Bowman saw it, Djelina Lekutanovic has a viable argument that the city should have installed metal guardrails around the parking lot. But the Appellate Division said the parking lot, bordered as it was by ordinary curbs, was reasonably safe for those who obey the rules of the road, and Bowman should have let the city out of Lekutanovic’s personal injury lawsuit. Lekutanovic v. City of New York (October 16)
TORT: Justice Douglas E. McKeon allowed Elizabeth Joseph to proceed to trial in a slip and fall case against a carpet store based on a claim that according to the Appellate Division boiled down to “rank speculation.” Joseph asserted that the store should be held liable for a slippery sidewalk because the store’s effort to remove snow made conditions worse. In fact, said the Appellate Division, while the store's efforts to remove snow from the adjacent sidewalk were incomplete, Joseph offered no evidence that the effort made the sidewalk any more hazardous than it would have been, and her claim should have been dismissed. Joseph v. Pitkin Carpet, Inc. (October 16)
CRIMINAL: Justice Edward M. Davidowitz prevented Manuel DeJesus from presenting evidence that could have persuaded the jury he wasn't guilty of the most serious drug-sale charge he faced, said the Appellate Division. Given the paucity of other evidence, the appellate panel was compelled to vacate his conviction on that count. Davidowitz erred in denying the defendant’s motion to reopen the case to allow testimony from a witness who would have explained that people other than DeJesus had keys to a truck in which drugs were found that defendant was convicted of constructively possessing. Because of the paucity of evidence linking DeJesus to the drugs in the trunk, the additional testimony could have created reasonable doubt about his guilt on the criminal possession count and therefore, the error by Davidowitz was not harmless, the appellate panel concluded. People v. DeJesus (October 16)
NEW YORK COUNTY
LANDLORD/TENANT: Bianca Jagger got more satisfaction from Justice Leland DeGrasse in a dispute over a rent controlled apartment than she was entitled to get, at least according to three of the five judges on an Appellate Division panel that reviewed the case. DeGrasse and the two dissenters who sided with him saw no reason why Jagger shouldn’t be able to claim for visa purposes that her “permanent residence” is in England while at the same time claiming her “primary residence” is a rent-controlled apartment in New York. The majority disagreed, ruling that DeGrasse should have granted summary judgment to the landlord in this action to eject Jagger from her apartment on grounds that it is her nonprimary residence. Katz Park Avenue Corp. v. Jagger (October 18)
SENTENCING: Justice Arlene D. Goldberg correctly discerned that Joel Vasquez deserved to be resentenced under the 2005 Drug Law Reform Act. But the reduced term of nine years that she imposed was still excessive, said the Appellate Division,which reduced the term to six years. People v. Vasquez (October 16)
SENTENCING: Justice Edward J. McLaughlin sentenced Johnny Rios too harshly, according to the Appellate Division, which cut the 37-year sentence imposed on defendant for his conviction on charges of attempted sodomy, sexual abuse and public lewdness, by directing that all sentences run concurrently, resulting in a new aggregate term of 15 years. Modified. People v. Rios (October 18)
QUEENS COUNTY
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: Justice Valerie Brathwaite Nelson should have dismissed the claim against a doctor filed by survivors of a patient who allegedly sustained fatal injuries when he fell from his bed in a nursing home, the Appellate Division said. The doctor proved to the satisfaction of a unanimous appellate panel that he had ordered the use of side rails on the decedent's bed in order to prevent exactly the sort of accident that happened, so Nelson should have let the doctor out of the suit. Kane v. Ausubel (October 9)
JURORS: Justice Ronald Hollie committed a reversible error when he replaced two regular jurors with two alternate jurors, after jury deliberations had begun, without obtaining written consent signed by the defendant in open court in the presence of the judge, as required by law. Even prosecutors conceded that Hollie’s screw-up compelled the Appellate Division to vacate the conviction of Robert Martin on charges of robbery, tampering with a witness and intimidating a victim or witness. People v. Martin (October 9)
LEGAL MALPRACTICE: Justice Joseph P. Dorsa should have granted the motion of attorney Andrew P. Jones to vacate his default in answering a legal malpractice complaint, and Dorsa should have dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Appellate Division said. The plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt to serve the summons and complaint at the attorney’s law office, even though it appeared to be vacant, did not constituted "due diligence" under the circumstances, the appellate panel concluded. Jones, after all, was suspended from the practice of law at the time of the attempted service of process. The affidavit of service does not mention any efforts by the plaintiff to finds out where Jones lives and to serve process at that location. Estate of Edward S. Waterman v. Jones (October 16)
TORT: Justice Thomas Polizzi was too quick to let the condominium board off the hook for a personal injury suit brought by Maria Soto-Lopez, who slipped on a greasy spot in a common area. As the Appellate Division noted, “The defendants offered no evidence to establish when the area in question was last inspected or cleaned on the day of the accident, and their submissions reveal the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether they had constructive notice of the alleged greasy substance which caused the plaintiff to fall.” Soto-Lopez v. Board of Managers of Crescent Tower Condominium (October 16)


Comments
I am frankly shocked at your lead in article about Brooklyn judges being pro- plaintiff - I believe that this article violates many of your rules in your mission statement for the following reasons: It makes your publication seem to be a) pro defendant - more like you are part of the business council, then an independent organiztion that wants better judges, more transparncy in the election process b)some of these decisions may or may not be reversed in the future by the Court of Appeals. While I recognize that the greater majority of them will not simply because it is so difficult to get a case heard by the court of appeals, you have jumped to conclusions about some of the cases and without more have cast aspersions against some hardworking underpaid jurists. Your publication obviously, does not take any critical look at the Appellate Divisions. The second department, being the largest department in the state, will typically reduce verdicts that aren't that large, without really giving any guidance to the judges below. Moreover they have lately been writing opinions, without giving enough facts to help the lower court differentiate when a seemingly similar case comes before them. The lower court is left with dicta, that would appear to fit all seemingly same fact patterns. In fact one reversal you cite to against judge solomon was exactly for that reason. The Appellate Division even said so in their reversal of him, telling the lower court that there was a fact difference in the opinion HE RELIED UPON to grant summary judgment for the plaintiff. That crucial fact was NEVER IN THE OPINION PUBLISHED BY THE SECOND DEPARTMENT. Therefore, when Judge Solomon granted the motion, he did so thinking he was FOLLOWING THE LAW as set out by a very recent Appellate Division case.
Your cursory look at the "reversal rates" of some of the judges, without examining their reasoning, what it was based on, and why they were found to be in error by the Appellate Division, is unfair and frankly beneath your laudatory mission statement.
What we need more of is some uniformity from the Appellate Division, or at the very least more information regarding the facts of a case before them, so that the lower court and lawyers can differentiate their case from a seemingly favorable opinion. Please remember that no lower court judge likes to be reversed. They generally don't decide a case in a manner that flies in the face of establised law so that they invite reversal.
These inflammatory articles demean your organization. I hope not to see them in the future.
Posted by: helene blank | October 24, 2007 10:48 AM
With regard to Ms. Blank's thoughtful comments, I'm reminded of Justice Jackson's observation concerning appellate review: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” Brown, 344 U.S. at 540 (1953). Not uncommonly, reversals demonstrate disagreement, not error. Sometimes, I fear, people misconstrue a reversal as a determination that the lower court judge was "wrong" and the appellate court got it "right," when in fact the reveral reflects nothing more than a different view of a complex question.
Posted by: Hon. James A. Yates | October 30, 2007 11:24 AM