COMPETENCY RAILROAD
By Mark Thompson
Posted 10-17-07
New York County Justice James A. Yates wasn't as skeptical as he should have been about whether Kenneth Rivers really was mentally competent to proceed to trial, according to the Appellate Division.
Two psychiatrists who had examined Rivers found him unfit to proceed to trial due to mental illness. But Rivers insisted he was mentally up to the task, and the defense attorney and prosecutor agreed. That was good enough for Yates, who allowed the case to proceed to trial without even holding a hearing on the defendant’s state of mind.
The appeals panel didn’t reverse Rivers’ conviction, at least not yet. His mental state at the time of trial can be reconstructed in a hearing, with testimony from the judges, lawyers and others who observed him in action. If the evidence supports the decision at the start of trial that he was mentally fit, Yates can proceed to impose a sentence. But sentencing will be held in abeyance for now, pending completion of the competency proceeding, the appellate panel said. People v. Rivers (October 9)
NEW YORK COUNTY
FAMILY: Justice Rhoda J. Cohen was reversed for slapping Anthony J. for derivative neglect of a child -- his own daughter’s half sister -- even though Cohen had just ruled that Anthony was not “legally responsible” for her. It's not "legally possible" to do that, the Appellate Division said, reversing Cohen and vacating the finding of neglect. Matter of Anjanne J. v. Anthony J. (October 11)
LABOR LAW: Justice Emily Jane Goodman properly allowed an injured cable repair woman to proceed with a suit against the owner of a parking garage that was littered with debris, which slipped out from under the worker’s ladder. But according to four of the five judges on an Appellate Division panel, Goodman misapplied the Labor Law section governing injuries that occur during construction-related work when she allowed the plaintiff, Dorothea Rhodes-Evans, to sue the building owner. As the appellate majority noted, Rhodes-Evans’ work at the site entailed splicing a fiber into a pre-existing fiber optic cable for one tenant in the building, a job that did not effect a “significant physical change” to the building and therefore did not amount to an alteration as defined in the statute. Rhodes-Evans v. 111 Chelsea LLC. (October 11)
REAL ESTATE: Justice Saralee Evans correctly ruled that the owner of a building next to an expressway owned the understructure, which consisted of a deteriorating deck and supporting columns that kept the building from tumbling onto the expressway, a mess that the owner wanted to palm off on the city. Evans wisely nixed that gambit, but she went too far with a summary judgment declaring that the building owner not only owned the understructure, he was fully responsible for the cost of its repair. There is a good deal of evidence that salt from the expressway in winter has eroded the understructure, and that might warrant imposition of liability on the city for all or part of the repairs, once all the facts and figures are presented in a trial, the appellate panel said. Cannon Point North, Inc. v. City of New York (October 9)
LABOR LAW: Justice Harold Beeler needs to go back and take a closer look at whether Anthony Quattrocchi actually was to blame for his own worksite injuries, which Beeler summarily pinned on his employer, the Appellate Division said. With the summary judgment on liability in the worker’s favor, Beeler brushed aside indications that Quattrocchi’s own negligence brought a scaffolding plank down upon his head. The plank was propped atop two open doors in a doorway that was under construction and allegedly clearly marked as closed to passers through. Quattrocchi apparently pushed his way through anyway with a load of two-by-fours, nudging a door open, dislodging the scaffolding board, which is conduct that requires a closer look than Beeler gave it in his summary proceeding. Quattrocchi v. F.J. Sciame Construction Corp. (October 9)
SENTENCING: Justice Edward J. McLaughlin tacked two unnecessary drug-possession counts onto Edgar Gortspujuls’ conviction for a count of selling drugs, said the Appellate Division, which vacated the two lesser counts. They were extraneous, the judges explained, because they were based on the same transaction as the sale. The appellate panel declined to reverse McLaughlin on another issue raised in the appeal. He delivered a jury instruction that included some “inappropriate departures” from standard instructions on the issue of reasonable doubt, the appellate panel acknowledged. But McLaughlin’s ad-lib charge was not constitutionally deficient because there was no reason to believe the jury could have been misled into believing that the prosecution’s burden was anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the panel concluded. People v. Gortspujuls (October 9)
BRONX COUNTY
TORT: All but one judge on the Appellate Division panel said Douglas E. McKeon should have dismissed Devon Moore’s suit against a medical group for an alleged misdiagnosis that cost the infant plaintiff a testicle. McKeon and one dissenter thought there was enough evidence to make a case that the doctors may have been too nonchalant about a hernia, which later developed the fateful complications. But the appellate panel majority didn’t think so, reversing McKeon and dismissing the baby’s lawsuit. The board-certified pediatrician who testified for the defense convinced the appellate panelists that since the baby’s hernia was not “incarcerated” when he was treated at the medical center, the doctors did exactly the right thing in deciding that “reduction” of the hernia in lieu of surgery was the proper course of action. Moore v. New York Medical Group, P.C. (October 9)
KINGS COUNTY
TORT: Justice Sylvia Hinds-Radix was reversed for employing an overly rigid application of a statute of limitations to dismiss a suit against allegedly racist police practices. The suit, brought by Kevin Pendleton against a police officer who arrested him, was based on an admittedly untimely claim against the officer for false arrest and imprisonment for an incident that had occurred years earlier. That claim was properly dismissed. But Hinds-Radix erred in also dismissing the cause of action against the city alleging that city officials were “deliberately indifferent” to racially discriminatory police policies and procedures that especially target African-Americans. Hinds-Radix should have invoked the “relation-back” doctrine to get around the time limit, the appellate panel said. The latest allegations, after all, are “amplifications” of an earlier suit alleging that the city failed to properly train police, an action that was filed well within the three-year statute of limitation. The latest complaint escapes dismissal on statute of limitations grounds because it relates back to the original complaint, the appellate panel concluded, reinstating the cause of action against the city. Pendleton v. City of New York (October 9)
INSURANCE: Justice Mark Partnow was reversed for rejecting an insurance company’s request for relief from a default judgment. The insurer offered what struck the Appellate Division as a “reasonable excuse” for failing to appear or answer the complaint: a “clerical oversight regarding the delay in forwarding the summons and complaint to its attorney.” Perez v. Travco Insurance Co. (October 9)

